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On April 12, Péter Magyar, leader of the relatively new TISZA party, achieved a landslide victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections. Garnering over half of the vote, Magyar’s coalition, campaigning against what it described as the rampant corruption of the ruling Fidesz government, secured a two-thirds supermajority in the Hungarian National Assembly, paving the way for Magyar to institute policy with little to no constitutional challenge. 

Many have championed TISZA’s victory as a decisive blow to “Orbanism”—an eurosceptic illiberalism that kneecaps non-government media, civil society organizations, and judicial autonomy. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, celebrated Orbán’s defeat, exclaiming that Hungary had “chosen Europe.” Other EU leaders, including France’s Emmanuel Macron and Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk, also congratulated Magyar on his victory. 

What is notable is that those who are celebrating Orbán’s defeat are members of the European centre to centre-left political establishment. Their congratulatory remarks suggest that Hungary’s political shift is one towards progressive reform, pro-Europeanism, and an end to Hungarian Russophilia. Not only politicians, but also the international media have proclaimed this as a defeat for right-wing populism in Europe.

This interpretation, for many, is logical. After all, Orbán was indeed a far-right leader. He was an authoritarian, a Eurosceptic, and a Trump-ally. Indeed, this notion of Orbán’s position as the right-wing option in the parliamentary elections was hammered in when U.S. Vice President JD Vance decided to campaign for Fidesz in the week leading up to the elections on April 12. Thus, many would see this as a blow to the European right, yet that's not exactly the case.

While Fidesz and Orbán are indeed right-wing, in the traditional sense, so are Magyar and his party TISZA. In several instances,  Magyar has attempted to align himself to the right of Orbán on specific issues. For example, leading up to the election, he accused migrant workers of eating ducks, a statement reminiscent of Trump’s immigration rhetoric leading up to the 2024 United States Presidential elections. Another example can be seen in the aftermath of the election, Magyar stating that Hungary would not support Ukraine’s fast-tracking accession into the European Union. 

Where Magyar differed from Orbán more clearly is in his respect for institutions and a foreign-policy orientation towards the European Union, away from Russia and China. But Magyar is still a conservative populist. What Magyar’s victory really reveals is that Hungarians, and therefore Europeans, are still attracted to right-wing policies, but they simultaneously want to retain liberal institutions and have a foreign policy that is generally pro-European. Truly, as looking at the wider trends, the European right is still a powerful force.

To put political faces to the trends, Magyar-esque politicians can be seen elsewhere in Europe. Giorgia Meloni is an example of this, a right-wing leader who, despite her radical past, has combined pro-European and pro-Ukrainian stances in policy. Or take Jordan Bardella, a rising force in the French far-right with a similar political repositioning as Italy’s Meloni. Unlike Orbán, these figures do not seek to dismantle the institutional order, but rather to govern through it, proving that the new right is increasingly comfortable operating within the very frameworks it once vowed to disrupt. This shift signals a move toward a more sophisticated conservative populism that aims to capture and utilize the state’s machinery rather than simply breaking it.

Taken together, the European right is, at the current rate, ascendant. But it still lacks a general vision beyond right-wing policies. Does the European right align itself with Trumpism in the United States, particularly after the anti-European actions of President Donald Trump? Does the European right stand in cooperation or in opposition to Putin’s Russia? Should the European right respect liberal institutions or bring them down? These are questions that the European Right will have to deal with as it evolves—many of which could now be answered by the Hungarian elections. 

Magyar’s victory should not be understood as a defeat of right-wing populism, but merely the refinement of the growing movement within existing democratic frameworks.